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Imitating attackBy leveraging crowdsourcing, Web credibility evaluation systems (WCESs) have become a promising tool to as-
sess the credibility of Web content, e.g., Web pages. However, existing systems adopt a passive way to collect
users' credibility ratings, which incurs two crucial challenges: (1) a considerable fraction of Web content have
few or even no ratings, so the coverage (or effectiveness) of the system is low; (2) malicious users may submit
fake ratings to damage the reliability of the system. In order to realize a highly effective and robustWCES,we pro-
pose to integrate recommendation functionality into the system. On the one hand, by fusingMatrix Factorization
and Latent Dirichlet Allocation, a personalizedWeb content recommendation model is proposed to attract users
to rate more Web pages, i.e., the coverage is increased. On the other hand, by analyzing a user's reaction to the
recommendedWeb content, we detect imitating attackers, which have recently been recognized as a particular
threat to WCES to make the systemmore robust. Moreover, an adaptive reputation system is designed to moti-
vate users to more actively interact with the integrated recommendation functionality.We conduct experiments
using both real datasets and synthetic data to demonstrate how our proposed recommendation components sig-
niﬁcantly improve the effectiveness and robustness of existing WCES.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 Based onour study, the probability that aWebsite has credibility evaluation is strongly1. Introduction
The Internet has become the primary information source to serve
people's daily life. However, unlike traditional media such as television
and newspapers, a considerable fraction of contents are posted online
without being seriously fact-checked. This may incur serious conse-
quences if non-credible Web information is used for decision making.
It is thus important to assess the credibility of Web content [6,20,17].
Recently, by leveraging crowdsourcing, severalWeb credibility eval-
uation systems (WCESs) have emerged. For instance, MyWOT (www.
mywot.com) aggregates users' ratings on two aspects of Web credibili-
ty: trustworthiness and child safety. In academia, similar systems have
also been proposed, improving the commercial counterparts in various
aspects [22,21,18].
AlthoughWCES has become a promising tool to assessWeb credibil-
ity, most existing systems adopt a passive way to collect users' ratings
(i.e., they wait for users to submit ratings, but actually only a few
users voluntarily provide Web credibility assessments), which incurs
two crucial challenges. First, given the huge volume of Web pages, a con-
siderable fraction of them have no credibility information. For instance,
based on our analysis, among the top 1 million domains in Alexa trafﬁck@pjwstk.edu.pl (R. Nielek),
A. Wierzbicki),
. This is an open access article underranking (www.alexa.com), only around 42.67% of them (as of January
9th, 2013) are covered by themost representative credibility evaluation
siteMyWOT, not tomention the domainswith lowpopularity.1 Further-
more, most domains covered by MyWOT have a limited amount of rat-
ings, i.e., the conﬁdence of their credibility information is low.
Second, malicious users may submit fake ratings to attack certain Web
content. Although existing reputation systems can handle average mali-
cious users, they are not effective in detecting smart attackers. In [14], a
new type of attack called imitating attack is identiﬁed and veriﬁed: an
attacker queries the credibility of certain Web content, when he re-
ceives the rating from the system, he just copies and resubmits the
same rating to the system again as his own contribution.2 From the per-
spective of the system, this attacker behaves quite similarly to a highly
reputable user because his ratings are always consistent with the
system's ratings. In this way, the attacker can easily build high reputa-
tion by cheating the system and then effectively attack certainWeb con-
tent. A machine learning based defense mechanism is proposed in [14],
but its computational complexity analysis is missing, so its applicability
in a large-scale system with millions of users has not been veriﬁed.correlated with its popularity, i.e., ranking.
2 Note that aggregating users' ratings to derive system's ratings is another yet challeng-
ing research question, particularlywhen aWeb content is highly subjective [11]. However,
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and herewe assume that system's ratings have
been reliably generated.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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to integrate recommendation functionality into a WCES to (1) attract
users to rate more Web pages to increase the coverage of the system
and (2) defend against the imitating attack tomake the systemmore ro-
bust. To achieve the ﬁrst goal, we propose a recommendation model to
learn users' interests in Web content by fusing Matrix Factorization
(MF) and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4]. Speciﬁcally, each Web
content is represented by a “bag-of-words”. We apply LDA to extract a
set of topics for the Web content, and assign a latent factor vector to
each topic. A user's interest in a Web content is inferred by combining
(1) the correlation between a user and the topics (by multiplying
user-speciﬁc and topic-speciﬁc latent factors) and (2) the correlation
between the Web content and the topics (by LDA).
In order to realize the second goal, we propose a recommendation
based defense mechanism. The system ﬁrst selects a set of active
users3 and recommends a set of interesting Web pages to them. Along
with a recommended content, a fake credibility rating is shown and
the system entices users to provide their ratings to make the system's
rating more conﬁdent. Since imitating attackers simply copy system's
ratings, they will copy (submit) the fake rating with a high probability.
On the other hand, honest users often spend efforts in evaluating the
recommended Web content, and submit a rating that is closer to the
real credibility. We propose to model users' responses to the recom-
mended Web content using beta distribution to detect imitating
attackers.
To further enhance the effectiveness and efﬁcacy of the integrated
recommendation functionality, we design an adaptive reputation system
to motivate users to more actively rate the recommendedWeb content. The
basic idea is to assign different reputation points to users when they rate
Web content in different ways. For instance, more reputation will be
awarded if a user rates a recommended content than a self-selected
content. Since rating the recommendedWeb content can boost reputa-
tion rapidly, both honest users and attackers are motivated to actively
interact with recommendations thus further improving the system's
coverage and robustness.
Although Web credibility, recommender systems and reputation
systems have been well studied in their respective literature, to the
best of our knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst one that seamlessly inte-
grates diverse information sources by applying various information
retrieval techniques to realize a highly effective and robust WCES. The
contributions of this work are summarized as follows: (1) In order
to handle the challenges of coverage and robustness, we propose to
integrate recommendation functionality into a WCES (see Section 3
System model). Note that such a system is independent and self-
contained, i.e., it is not designed as a component of other information
systems, e.g., Web search engines. (2) By combining MF and LDA, we
propose a personalized recommendation model to motivate users to
rate moreWeb pages (Section 4.1). (3) In order to defend against the
imitating attack, we propose a recommendation based defense
mechanism. The system recommends a set of Web pages with fake
credibility ratings to users and analyzes their rating behavior in the
presence of recommendations. Beta distribution is used to model a
user's imitating behavior probability (Section 4.2). (4) For the pur-
pose of enhancing the effectiveness of the integrated recommenda-
tion functionality, in Section 4.3, we design an adaptive reputation
system to award more reputation points when a user rates the rec-
ommended Web content. This not only motivates normal users to
rate more to increase system's coverage, but also entices malicious
users to copy fake credibility rating (i.e., get detected). (5) We eval-
uate the effectiveness of the recommendation functionality using the
data published by Wikimedia foundation as well as a simulated
multi-agent system (Section 5).3 In order to quickly build high reputation, attackers typically densely submit ratings
thus are highly active in certain periods of time.2. Background and related work
2.1. Web credibility
Quite a fewworks have identiﬁed a variety of factors that may inﬂu-
ence an individual's perception of Web credibility [7,6,24]. For instance,
Schwarz et al. [20] showed that visualizations by considering features
such as Webpage popularity, domain type and the PageRank metric,
can improve a user's Web credibility assessment in Web search results.
Recently, WCES has become popular in both academia and industry.
Shariﬁ et al. [22] proposed SmartNotes, a crowdsourcing system to de-
tect Web security threats such as Internet scams. Machine learning
and natural language processing are applied to analyze and integrate
users' reports. In [18],Web credibility is assessed by a decentralized rec-
ommender system. A single credibility metric is derived by combining
three components: (1) item-based collaborative ﬁltering, which is
based on features identiﬁed from pages' textual contents, (2) user-
based collaborative ﬁltering, which is based on users' social relation-
ships and (3) Web search page ranking.
In practice,MyWOT is a real-world example of aWCES that can have
a real economic impact on content providers. In MyWOT, entire do-
mains receive credibility ratings, and these ratings are later used by a
Web browser extension that displays them next to Google search re-
sults. A domain that has a very low rating could therefore experience
a signiﬁcant decrease of Web trafﬁc, even if it would be ranked high
by Google. Therefore, a competitor of some commercial company
would have a real incentive to maliciously decrease his competitor's
credibility rating. This could be achieved through several simple
means, such as spamming the MyWOT system automatically with neg-
ative credibility ratings. However, such crude means could be equally
easily detected. This motivates attackers to devise more sophisticated
means, out of which an imitating attack is one of the least expensive
and most effective.
AlthoughWCES has been studied recently, its robustness issue is rel-
atively unexplored. Most existing solutions apply reputation systems to
constrain users' rating behavior, however, smart attackers can easily
cheat for high reputation. Liu et al. [14] identiﬁed a new type of attack
called imitating attack, where a malicious user simply copies and
resubmits the system's ratings to pretend to be a reputable user to
gain high reputation. By studying Web pages' characteristics and
users' rating behavior patterns, a two-stage machine learning based de-
fensemechanism is proposed. Experimental results demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the approach, but its computational complexity analysis is
not provided. In this work, we try to defend against the imitating attack
using a light-weight, recommendation based approach.2.2. Recommender systems
Although no recommendation is provided in existingWCES, recom-
mender systems have been widely studied in many other application
scenarios such as e-commerce and online social networks. Traditional
recommender systems rely on collaborative ﬁltering [1], which predicts
a user's interest in an item bymining rating information of other similar
users and items. In particular, MF has been proved to be one of themost
effective methods in terms of rating prediction [12].
In order to improve recommendation quality, a variety of types of in-
formation, e.g., social information and contextual information is inte-
grated into MF. For instance, in [13], the authors applied random
decision trees to combine diverse types of contexts. Social information
is integrated as a MF regularization term, but different from previous
work [15], contexts are considered whenmeasuring user similarity. Re-
cently, content based recommendation has been improved by fusing
topic modeling and MF [2,16]. The basic idea is to assign a latent topic
to each word of an item, and then generate item latent factors by aver-
aging the topics of all words associated with this item. A missing rating
101X. Liu et al. / Decision Support Systems 79 (2015) 99–108is predicted by combining the target user's afﬁnity to the topics and the
correlation between the topics and the target item.
Any collaborative recommender system that takes as input users'
ratings is vulnerable to the imitating attack. An example can be
MovieLens, a system for recommending movies (www.movielens.org)
that lets a user search for a movie and rate it. This means that users se-
lectmovies theywant to rate, and see the system's recommendation be-
fore they rate. These are the necessary condition for vulnerability to the
imitating attack and a variety of other attacks. Needless to say, movie
distributors have a real incentive to inﬂuence the ratings of this popular
service.
2.3. Reputation systems
Reputation systems have been widely deployed in many online ap-
plications (e.g., online auction sites) to constrainmalicious users' behav-
ior [10]. The beta reputation system proposed by Josang et al. [9]
estimates the reputation of an agent using a probabilistic model,
i.e., based on the beta probability density function (PDF). The distribu-
tion parameters α and β are determined by the number of successful
and unsuccessful interactions between a pair of agents. On the basis of
beta reputation system, Travos et al. [23] paid more attention to the
issue of fake third party feedback. That is, if ﬁrsthand experience is in-
sufﬁcient to reliably estimate the reputation of the target agent, second
hand experience is used, considering the reliability of the information
provider.
In WCES, e.g., MyWOT, a reputation system is also applied. Reputa-
tion scores are assigned to users if they provide credibility ratings and
theweight of a user's rating on the ﬁnal credibility aggregation is deter-
mined by his reputation. Although MyWOT does not reveal details of
how reputation is computed, a user's reputation is indeed proportional
to the activeness of his rating behavior: “When you start usingMyWOT,
your ratings have little weight, but if you keep rating sites consistently,
your ratings will be considered more reliable over time4”. As discussed
in [14], imitating attackers can easily cheat such a reputation system
by frequently copying system's ratings. Furthermore, current reputation
systems are not particularly designed for recommendation based cred-
ibility assessment, so in this work, we propose an adaptive reputation
system to both motivate users to rate recommended Web content and
assist to expose imitating attackers.
3. Systemmodel
Logically, aWCES acts as a knowledge repository that provides cred-
ibility ratings for the queried Web content. Fig. 1 demonstrates how a
WCES works. A user browses a Web content and rates it (if she wants)
based on her personal judgment about the credibility of this content.
The rating is then submitted to the system for contributing to the ﬁnal
credibility of this Web content. As a consumer, a user may also query
the credibility of certain Web content for decision making. The system
processes the query (via query engine) by checking its credibility infor-
mation storage module and returns the rating information (if any)
which is derived by credibility calculation engine. Reputation system
is used to assess the reliability of individual users based on their past rat-
ing behavior, which is stored in user information storage module. Typi-
cally, more reputable users' ratings have higher impact on the ﬁnal
credibility assessment.
On the basis of a traditional WCESmodel, we add the recommenda-
tion functionality by integrating a recommendation component (see
Fig. 1, red box). Web content recommendation engine serves two
purposes: (1) it provides personalized Web content recommendation
to individual users to attract them to rate more recommended Web
pages (see Section 4.1). (2) It deliberately recommends Web content4 http://www.mywot.com/en/faq/website/rating-websites#reliableratings.with fake credibility information to suspicious users and analyzes their
reactions to the recommendations. Users with evident imitation behav-
ior will be detected (see Section 4.2).
Note thatwithin our Reconcile project, the proposedmodel has been
implemented as a prototype WCES (http://reconcile.pl). The Reconcile
system works similarly to MyWOT— users can install a browser exten-
sion that receives ratings from the Reconcile backend. The system has
been designed to be resistant to adversaries, because little weight is
given to ratings received from users who select the rated content them-
selves, and who have a low reputation. In order to earn reputation, a
user has to rate Web pages chosen by the recommender system,
which are displayed in the “Suggested pages” panel. The recommender
system works similarly to the recommendation method described in
Section 4.1. When a user submits a rating, the rating is used to update
her reputation, using the method described in Section 4.3. Overall, the
proposed method gives a signiﬁcant degree of protection not just
against imitating attacks, but also against coalition attacks and other
kinds of adversary strategies.
4. Recommendation functionality integration
4.1. A personalized Web content recommendation model
The goal of our recommendationmodel is to recommendWebpages
that are likely to interest individual users such that they will rate more
Web pages to signiﬁcantly increase the system's coverage. We denote a
set of Web pages by P ¼ fp1; p2;…g. Each Web content is associated
with a credibility rating that is a discrete quantitative value in the
range L={l1, l2,…, ll} ∪ l0, where l0 indicates that aWeb content's cred-
ibility rating is unknown. U ¼ fu1;u2;…g denotes a set of users partici-
pating in the WCES.
We use MF [12], which is the state-of-the-art collaborative ﬁltering
technique to build our recommendation model. We ﬁrst construct a
probability matrixMp ∈RjUjjPjwhich records the interactions between
users andWeb content. An elementmu,cp is 1 if user u has rated theWeb
content c, otherwise, the element is empty (i.e.,missing).We then apply
MF to factorize Mp into one user speciﬁc matrix Up ∈RkpjUj and
one Web content speciﬁc matrix Vp ∈RkpjPj . Each user u's latent
factor vector Uup and each Web content c's latent factor vector Vcp
can be derived (iteratively updated) over existing matrix entries
by performing stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [8]: Upu←U
p
u− γ
∂L
Upu
;
Vpc ← V
p
c − γ
∂L
Vpc
, where γ is the learning rate. Eqs. (1) and (2) show how
gradient descent is performed with respect to Up and Vp respectively.
∂L
Upu
¼ eu;cVpu−λUpu; ð1Þ
∂L
Vpc
¼ eu;cUpu−λVpc ; ð2Þ
where eu,c is the aggregated difference between the predicted value and
the corresponding ground truth. The probability of an interaction be-
tween user u and a Web content c (i.e., u rated c) is then predicted:
mpu;c ¼ Upu
 TVpc : ð3Þ
For the target user u, we sort in descending order a list ofWeb pages
that have little credibility information and have not been rated by u
based on the predicted probabilities, and recommend top-K Web
pages to u.
4.1.1. Topic-boosted MF
Pure MF based approach recommends Web content to users based
on their rating information. However, it is non-trivial to accurately
Fig. 1. A system model for Web credibility evaluation with recommendation functionality.
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rating based recommendation infers that a user is interested in sports
news.However, this user actually only read and rated articles about bas-
ketball, and in particular, about NBA, so recommending other irrelevant
sports news (based on similar users' ratings) like Formula One may not
attract the user to rate. On the other hand, topicmodeling is able to infer
latent topic variables from a corpus of documents [4], and such topics
can be naturally applied to describe the interest of a user based on the
textual contents she has interacted with. We therefore propose to inte-
grate texts into MF to improve the accuracy of interest matching.
We ﬁrst sample a set of Web pages as training data. The main con-
tent of everyWeb content is extracted5 to form a textual content corpus
T . We then apply LDA, a popular topic model on the corpus T to extract
D topics. Different from previous work [16] where the dimensionality of
user/item latent factor vector is bounded by the number of topics, in this
work, each topic is also associated with a latent factor vector, sharing
the same latent space with the user speciﬁc latent factors.
Accordingly, the correlation between a user and a Web content,
which was captured through the user speciﬁc andWeb content speciﬁc
latent factors (see Eq. (3)), is reformulated by incorporating the effect of
texts/topics. Speciﬁcally, Web content speciﬁc matrix Vp is represented
by the product of two matrices:
Vp ¼ XY; ð4Þ
whereX ∈RkpD is the topic speciﬁc latent factormatrix. Each column of
X is a latent factor vector that characterizes the corresponding topic. Y ∈
RDjPj is a matrix that stores correlations between Web content and
topics. For a Web content c, we extract its main content to construct
“bag-of-words”, denoted by Tc. LDA assigns a latent topic t to each
word w ∈ Tc with a probability ζw,t. The correlation between topic t
and Web content c is calculated by averaging the topic distribution of
all words from Tc: Yc;t ¼∑
Nc
i¼1ζ i;t
Nc
, where Nc is the number of words
extracted from Tc. Therefore, when inferring user u's interest in Web
content c, u's interests in the D topics are ﬁrstly measured through
user speciﬁc and topic speciﬁc latent factors, and then the correlations5 There are several open source tools to extract main contents from HTML, e.g., cx-
extractor (https://code.google.com/p/cx-extractor/). We also remove stop words to make
the texts more compact and informative.between the D topics and the Web content c are obtained, ﬁnally the
two factors are fused to capture u's interest in c.
With topics, the correlation between users and Web content can be
moremeaningfully inferred than traditional approacheswhere only rat-
ing information (less interpretable) is used. Furthermore, the dimen-
sionality of latent factor vector is not bounded by the number of topics
thus is more ﬂexible (i.e., the optimal dimensionality and topic number
may not be identical, thus should be learned separately). By incorporat-
ing topics, the objective function is redeﬁned to minimize the sum of
prediction errors:
L0 ¼ min
U;X
1
2
XUj j
u¼1
XPj j
c¼1
Iuc Ruc− Upu
 TXYc
 2
þ λ
0
2
Uk k2F þ Xk k2F
 
: ð5Þ
We apply SGD to optimize this objective function by performing
gradient descent with respect to latent factors Up and X:
∂L0
Upu
¼ eu;cXYc−λ0Upu; ð6Þ
∂L0
X
¼ eu;cUpuYTc−λ0X; ð7Þ
where eu,c is the difference between the predicted value and the corre-
sponding ground truth. The ﬁnal user speciﬁc matrix Up and topic
speciﬁc matrix X are obtained by being iteratively updated: Upu←U
p
u−
γ0 ∂L
0
Upu
andX← X− γ0 ∂L
0
X , whereγ′ is the learning rate. By integrating topics
which are extracted from textual contents into MF, we predict the prob-
ability that user uwill rate a Web content c, which has no or insufﬁcient
ratings. According to the predicted probabilities, we sort a list of candi-
date Web pages, among which we recommend top-K ones to user u.
4.1.2. Discussion
Note that in practice, to make Web content recommendation not
only precise and personalized, but also secure and reliable, security
mechanisms should be applied. For instance, machine learning can be
applied to make the ﬁrst estimate of the credibility of Web content [5,
14], and some third party services, e.g., PhishTanks (www.phishtank.
com) and DNSBL (www.dnsbl.info) can be used to expose phishing
sites and Web spam. The Web content with security concerns must
not be recommended to users even if their contents “look” interesting.
Fig. 2. Recommendation based defense.
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can be developed. For instance, the system is able to recommend cred-
ible Web content to users for wise decision making in various ﬁelds
(e.g., a location-based restaurant recommendation service); users with
similar interests (learned from their ratings or credibility query histo-
ries) can form a credibility based online social network for credible in-
formation sharing. We leave the discussion on more sophisticated
services as future work.
4.2. Recommendation based defense mechanism against the imitating
attack
Besides recommending interestingWeb content to users to increase
the system's coverage, another functionality that our recommendation
component offers is to defend against the imitating attack, which is par-
ticularly harmful to WCES, i.e., existing reputation system is ineffective
in detecting such attacks. In this section, we propose a defense mecha-
nism by analyzing users' responses to recommendations.
As demonstrated in [14], to quickly build high reputation, imitating
attackers typically densely copy and re-submit system's ratings within
a short period of time. We therefore focus on the highly active users to
detect imitating attack.
Based on their activities over the past period of time, e.g., 24 h, a set
of active users are selected. For each user, we recommend a list of Web
pages based on her interest (see Section 4.1). Fig. 2 demonstrates how
the imitating attackers and normal users are expected to react to recom-
mendations.We assume the recommendedWeb pages already have re-
liable credibility information, but instead of showing the exact ratings to
users, the system provides fake ratings6 and asks for new ratings to
make the current fake ratings more “conﬁdent”. For instance, a recom-
mended Web content has a credibility rating of 4-point (assuming
ﬁve-point Likert-scale), but the system displays 2-point to the selected
users. The basic idea of manipulating ratings is to entice imitating at-
tackers to copy the fake ratings, which can be used as the evidence for
attack detection. For a normal user, if she decides to rate the recom-
mended Web content, her ratings are expected to be closer to the real
credibility rating than to the displayed fake rating. On the other hand,
imitating attackers may simply copy the fake ratings without actually
assessing the recommended Web content so their ratings are close to
the displayed fake ratings with high probability. It is worth mentioning6 Note that fake ratings are only displayed to the users to be tested; correct ratings are
returned when other users query, so system's usability is not affected.that controversial topics, aswell as users' bias/subjectivitymake the rat-
ings comparison non-trivial. However, this issue is not the focus of this
paper, and we assume that the system has certain mechanism to detect
and handle controversial contents [19]. Another option is to recom-
mend only the Web content whose credibility can be objectively
measured.
By comparing the displayed fake ratings and users' ratings,we are able
to estimate a user's imitation behavior. For a user u, we denote a vector of
recommended Web pages that user u has rated by Pur = {p1r , p2r ,…}. The
corresponding fake ratings (provided by the system) are denoted by
Lf = {l1f, l2
f,…}, and the user's ratings are denoted by Lu = {l1u, l2u,…}. We
say u's rating liu is consistent with the corresponding fake rating lif if
Δli = |liu− lif| is smaller than or equal to a predeﬁned threshold (e.g., 1
in 5-point Likert-scale). We then have a vector of rating consistence indi-
catorsΘu={θ1, θ2,…}, where θi=1 indicates that u's ith rating is consis-
tent with the corresponding fake rating, otherwise, θi is 0.
To infer the probability that user u performs imitation behavior, we
apply Beta distribution, which is commonly used to model the uncer-
tainty of the probability of a random event.Wemodel a series of consis-
tence indicators, i.e., Θu as observations of independent Bernoulli trials.
In each trial, the success probability ismodeled by Beta distributionwith
parameters α and β (we start with α= β= 1). After observing s suc-
cesses in n trials, the posterior density of the probability is Beta(α+ s,
β + n − s). Accordingly, the density function of the probability of
performing imitation behavior (by user u) is given by:
f pimiu jαu;βu
 
¼ Γ αu þ βu þ 2ð Þ
Γ αu þ 1ð ÞΓ βu þ 1ð Þ
pimiu
 αu
1−pimiu
 βu
; ð8Þ
where puimi indicates the probability that u performs imitation behavior,
αu (≥ 0) and βu (≥ 0) represent the numbers of u's ratings that are con-
sistent with the fake ratings or not respectively. Γ(.) is the gamma func-
tion. The expectation probability7 is then obtained by:
pimiu ¼
αu þ 1
αu þ βu þ 2
: ð9Þ
So if a user's imitation behavior probability is higher than a
predeﬁned threshold, this user is considered as imitating attacker. In
contrast to existing solutions that reply on complex machine learning7 We can also derive the conﬁdence interval of the estimated probability to ensure that
the estimated probability is conﬁdent [3].
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Fig. 3. Impact of the dimensionality of latent factors.
104 X. Liu et al. / Decision Support Systems 79 (2015) 99–108algorithms [14], the core of our defensemechanism is to derive a simple
posterior imitation behavior probability, thus can be easily applied to
large-scale settings.
The effectiveness of such a defense mechanism depends on the per-
formance of our recommendation model. If users actively rate the rec-
ommended Web content, their behaviors can be comprehensively
analyzed, and malicious users can be reliably detected. Otherwise, if
users refuse to rate, it is not possible to distinguish imitating attackers
from normal users. In order to further motivate users to actively rate
the recommended Web content, besides personalized recommenda-
tion, we also design an adaptive reputation systemwhichwill be elabo-
rated in the next section.4.3. An adaptive reputation system
A user ratesWeb content in twoways: (1) She ratesWeb pages that
are selected by herself. System is not involved in the selection process.
(2) She rates Web pages that are recommended by the system (see
Section 4.1). In existing systems, to make users more active in assessing
Web content, reputation points are awarded to rating submitters. Based
on this principle, we identify three scenarios where different reputation
points are awarded in different scenarios. If a user rates a self-selected
Web content, (1) if thisWeb content has no or only very little credibility
information, the system will give reputation points Rs0; (2) otherwise, if
the system already has sufﬁcient ratings of thisWeb content, reputation
points of Rs1 are assigned to the user; (3) if the user rates a recommend-
edWeb content, the systemwill give reputation points of Rr. Obviously,
the ratings are particularly valuable if aWeb content has little credibility
information, so Rs0≫ Rs1. Furthermore, sinceWeb content recommenda-
tion serves the purposes of both increasing the system's coverage and
detecting malicious users, Rr is set to larger than Rs0. An example of rep-
utation point distribution could be Rs0 = 10, Rs1 = 0.1 and Rr = 20.
Reputation points can be not only awarded, but also deducted.
When the system detects that a user submitted a fake rating, the corre-
sponding reputation points (previously awarded by the system) are
deducted from her reputation.8 Since more reputation points give
users more privileges such as becoming community leader, reducing
advertisements, etc., users aremotivated to rateWeb content with little
credibility information, or those that are recommended by the system,
thus increasing the system's coverage, as well as beneﬁting the recom-
mendation based defense mechanism.
We notice that imitating attackers can still gain reputation if they re-
fuse to rate the recommended Web content (avoid being detected) but
keep copying system's ratings (e.g., slowly aggregating Rs1). We can8 The awarded reputation is deducted only if a fake rating is detected with high conﬁ-
dence, e.g., the Web content is objective so a system rating can be reliably derived.reduce this effect by setting the maximum rating submission limit,
e.g., 100 per day.
5. Evaluation
5.1. Methodology
Firstly, we evaluate the performance of the integrated recommenda-
tion functionality, which is the core contribution of this paper. We use
the dataset of Article Feedback Tool (aft) v.4 published by Wikimedia
Foundation.9 The dataset contains 2,029,466 users (48,948 of them are
registered users)who issued 2,451,497 ratings to 715,444Wikipedia ar-
ticles. The credibility of an article is measured from four aspects: trust-
worthy, objective, complete and readable. For each user, we sort the
articles that she has rated in chronological order and select the ﬁrst
80% of the ratings as training data and test the rest ones.
We compare the performance of our recommendation model with
several baselines: (1) Random recommendation. This approach recom-
mends a list of randomly selected articles to a user. (2) LDA. Each
word in an article is associated with a distribution over topics derived
by LDA. By measuring the similarity of topic distributions of a pair of ar-
ticles, this approach recommends a list of articles that are themost sim-
ilar to the ones that have been rated by the target user.(3)MF. In this
approach, MF is applied to predict a user's interest in an item without
taking into account textual contents (see Eq. (3)). A list of articles that
are mostly likely to interest users is recommended.
To measure the accuracy of recommendations, we use two standard
metrics: Precision@ K, which deﬁnes the ratio of successfully predicted
articles to the K recommendations and Recall@ K, which deﬁnes the
ratio of successfully predicted articles to the number of articles to be
predicted.
Secondly, we evaluate the entire system as a whole. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that integrates recommendation
system and reputation system into aWeb content credibility evaluation
system to improve its robustness and effectiveness, so no suitable
dataset is publicly available. To conduct experiments, we build a
multi-agent system10 with 1000 Websites and 100 users consisting of
honest users and imitating attackers. The fraction of imitating attackers
is denoted by F. To make the simulation as realistic as possible, we fur-
ther divide these attackers into three groups: (1) Naive attackers who
copy the fake ratings of 80% of recommendedWebsites and submit ran-
dom ratings for the rest ones; (2) Medium attackers who copy the fake
ratings of 50% of recommended Websites, and submit random ratings
for the rest ones; (3) Smart attackers who copy the fake ratings of 20%9 http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Article_feedback/Data.
10 The simulator is publicly available at https://www.openabm.org/model/4471/
version/1/view.
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105X. Liu et al. / Decision Support Systems 79 (2015) 99–108of recommended Websites, and submit random ratings for the rest
ones. The fractions of different types of attackers are denoted by Fn, Fm
and Fs respectively (F = Fn + Fm + Fs). On the other hand, we set that
the probability of copying fake ratings for honest users follows Gaussian
distribution Nðμ ¼ 0:1; σ ¼ 0:1Þ. Note that defending against diverse
types of malicious users is essential for a practical system, but in this
work, we are focusing on imitating attack only.
Themetrics used in the evaluation include precision (the ratio of de-
tected attackers to the total number of predictionsMP), recall (the ratio
of detected attackers to all attackersMR) and F-measure (the combina-
tion of precision and recall:MF = 2MpMR/(MP +MR)).
Regarding the adaptive reputation system, each user is awarded
points when he/she rated the credibility of certain Web content. We
will study the reputation distribution of honest users and imitating at-
tackers to demonstrate how users' behavior is captured by our adaptive
reputation system, and the interplay between the recommendation sys-
tem and the reputation system.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Personalized recommendation
We ﬁrst report the performance of our Web content recommenda-
tion component. Figs. 3 and 4 show how precision@ K and recall@ K
vary with different values of (1) latent factor vector dimensionality kp
and (2) number of iterations of SGD I. Note that K is set to 5 for this
set of experiments. We observe that both precision@ K and recall@ K
ﬁrst increase, but when arriving at a certain point, they start decreasing
and then becomestable afterwards. This is because althoughMF is effec-
tive in rating prediction, recommendation is essentially a ranking10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000.3
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Fig. 5. Impact of the nproblem, thusmay not be optimized by directly applyingMF. Neverthe-
less, we note that kp = 12 and I= 50 are the optimal values that max-
imize the performance. In the following experiments, we use these
values for our approach.
Another parameter that inﬂuences the performance of our approach
is the number of topics. Fig. 5 shows how precision@ 5 and recall@ 5
vary with different numbers of topics. We observe that more topics in-
crease both precision and recall, but starting from around 50, larger
number of topics brings very limited improvement on the performance.
Considering the tradeoff between precision/recall and computational
overheads, we set the number of topics to 50 in the following
experiments.
Once parameters of our recommendation approach are tuned, we
compare the performance of our approachwith that of various baselines
(see Section 5.1). Fig. 6 shows the performance of variousmethodswith
different size of recommendation list. Obviously, for all approaches, the
larger the recommendation list, the higher probability the interesting
Web pages are recommended to individual users. So recall increases
with the increasing size of the recommendation list. On the other
hand, larger recommendation list size lowers down the corresponding
precision. As expected, random recommendation demonstrates very
poor performance, only about 1.8% of users' interested Web pages
were recommended when recommendation list size is as high as 10.
Both MF and LDA signiﬁcantly improve random recommendation, and
LDA is slightly better thanMF, indicating the importance of textual con-
tents. In all cases, our approach consistently outperforms other
approaches, demonstrating that integrating textual content intoMF fur-
ther improves the recommendation quality. In summary, for precision,
our approach improvesMF and LDA by 60.84% and 19.70% (on average)0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000.1
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106 X. Liu et al. / Decision Support Systems 79 (2015) 99–108respectively; for recall, the corresponding improvements are 64.45%
and 23.55% (on average) respectively.
5.2.2. Overall evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the entire system by studying how
different component inﬂuences the robustness of the system. Since
the recommendation functionality has been thoroughly evaluated in
the previous subsection, we assume top-5 Websites are provided, and
accordingly a user will choose a recommended Website to rate with0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
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Fig. 7(a) shows the performance of our defense mechanism when
the fraction of imitating attackers (F) varies from 0.2 to 0.8 with 0.1 as
increment. Note that the fractions of different types of attackers are
set as Fn=0.5, Fm=0.3 and Fs=0.2 respectively. The imitating behav-
ior probability threshold is set to 0.25. We observe that the recall does
not change evidently with F. This is because no matter how F varies,
Fn, Fm and Fs remain unchanged, so the fraction of imitating attackers0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.80.2
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107X. Liu et al. / Decision Support Systems 79 (2015) 99–108that can be detected by our defense mechanism is not affected. On the
other hand, when F increases, the imitating attackers become dominant
in the system, so the fraction of predictions that are able to successfully
detect attackers (i.e., precision) also increases.
Smart attackers behave similarly to normal users, thus are more dif-
ﬁcult to be detected. We then demonstrate how the fraction of smart
imitating attackers inﬂuences the performance of our approach (see
Fig. 7(b)). We ﬁrst set F = 0.3. Then we vary the fraction of smart at-
tackers Fs from 0.2 to 0.8with 0.1 as increment. Naive attackers andme-
dium attackers equally share the rest portion. Obviously, the higher the
fraction of smart imitating attackers, the lower the precision, recall and
F-measure become. Nevertheless, we observe evenwhen Fs is as high as
0.7, F-measure still reaches around 0.5, demonstrating the effectiveness
of our defense mechanism.
We then demonstrate the impact of imitating behavior probability
threshold (see Eq. (9)). Note that the fractions of various types of imitat-
ing attackers are set as F = 0.3, Fn = 0.4, Fm = 0.4 and Fs = 0.2. From
Fig. 7(c) we observe that extremely low or extremely high threshold in-
curs extremely low precision or recall, which is not acceptable. When
the threshold is 0.4, F-measure is maximized in this set of experiments.
Finally, we study how the adaptive reputation system inﬂuences
users' imitating behavior. We set that if a user rates a self-selected
Website that already has sufﬁcient ratings (i.e., the number of ratings
is larger than the median of the number of ratings for all Websites in
the system), 0.1 point is awarded; if the self-selected Website does
not have sufﬁcient ratings yet, 10 points are given. On the other hand,
if the user rates a recommended Website, 20 points are assigned.11
This is to motivate users to more actively interact with the recommen-
dation component. In order to study the inﬂuence of the recommenda-
tion, we setup two experimental settings: reputation system with
recommendation functionality, and that without recommendation. Pe-
riodically our simulator checks the correctness of ratings, if by compar-
ing with the ground truth (derived as the mean of all corresponding
ratings), a rating is determined to be incorrect, the corresponding
amount of points are deducted from the corresponding user's
reputation.
Fig. 8 demonstrates the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
reputation points of honest users anddifferent types of attackers.Wedi-
vide users' reputation points into 7 ranges: [0,1000), [1000,1100),
[1100,1200), [1200,1300), [1300,1400), [1400,1500) and [1500,1600).
Such ranges can help to distinguish different reputation levels, which
aremoremeaningful and interpretable than directly displaying numeric
values. By comparing the results in the two settings, we observe that
when recommendation functionality is provided, honest users'11 We also tried other reputation point values for ratings the three types ofWebsites and
observed the similar trends. Due to space limitation, we only reported one set of results
with the parameters of (0.1, 10, 20).reputations are signiﬁcantly higher than that of imitating attackers. On
the other hand,when recommendation functionality is absent, although
honest users' reputation points are generally higher than that of imitat-
ing attackers, the difference is not signiﬁcant.We thus conclude that the
integrated recommendation systemnot only helps to directly detect im-
itating attackers, but also boosts reputation system, which provides an
alternative way to study users' imitating behavior.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed to integrate recommendation func-
tionality into a WCES to handle the issues of coverage and robustness.
By fusing MF and LDA, a Web content recommendation model is pro-
posed to attract users to rate more recommended Web content. On
the other hand, to defend against the imitating attack, a recommenda-
tion baseddefensemechanism is proposedby investigatingusers' rating
behavior in the presence of recommendations. Beta distribution is ap-
plied to model and predict a user's imitating behavior probability. Fur-
thermore, we design an adaptive reputation system to further
motivate users to actively interact with the integrated recommendation
functionality.
Article feedback tool dataset and a simulatedmulti-agent system are
used to validate the performance of the proposed recommendation
model, imitating attack defense mechanism and adaptive reputation
system. In summary, our recommendation approach improves MF and
LDA by 60.84% and 19.70% respectively in terms of precision; for recall,
the corresponding improvements are 64.45% and 23.55%, respectively.
Regarding the recommendation based defense mechanism, by carefully
choosing imitating behavior probability threshold, imitating attackers
(even the smart ones) can be effectively detected.
A future direction is to take into account more information sources
such as user's proﬁles, contextual information, and external knowledge
databases (e.g., semantic linked data) to further improve the quality of
recommendation.We also intend to study real user behavior on the de-
ployed prototype system by leveraging Amazon Mechanical Turk and
explore defense mechanisms for coalition attacks.
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